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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FORCIBLE TRANSBORDER ABDUCTION: DEFENSIVE VERSUS
OFFENSIVE REMEDIES FOR ALVAREZ-MACHAIN

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario: You are sitting in your office steadfastly
working when armed gunmen burst in, kidnap you, and place you on an
airplane bound for Tijuana, Mexico, where they will hand you over to Mexican
officials. Upon arrival in Mexico, the court refuses to dismiss the indictment
even though the abduction violates the United States’ territorial sovereignty,
your personal rights, and international law. After the criminal case,
nonetheless, you might be granted an offensive remedy in which you can sue
your abductors and the Mexican government.1 It sounds extraordinary, but the
U.S. Supreme Court, along with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, has
effectively condoned this exact conduct—although in the reverse situation—
throughout the various stages of United States v. Alvarez-Machain.2 This

1. Several commentators have recognized the possibility of a reciprocal effect of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain, which condoned forcible transborder abductions.
One observed that “[t]he Court may not have considered the possible reciprocity of its decision
compelling. By subjecting foreign nationals to the vagaries of United States Government
abduction, the Court has diminished the protections of United States citizens.” David Ring, Note
and Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Literalism, Expediency and the “New World
Order,” 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 495, 532 (1994); see also Michael R. Wing, Extradition Treaties—
International Law—The United States Supreme Court Approves Extraterritorial Abduction of
Foreign Criminals—United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992), 23 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 435, 457-58 (1993). In a proposed Senate Resolution, Senator Moynihan also
acknowledged the possibility of U.S. citizens being kidnapped:
[T]here are terrorists the world over prepared to see Americans killed, and we have
legitimated the proposition that a foreign government can send agents into this country or
find agents in this country which will take Americans out of the jurisdiction, leave them
defenseless in foreign lands, and they will say to us, “You did it, and we are doing it.
What is the difference?”
S. Res. 319, 102d Cong. (1992).
2. 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to try a Mexican
national who was forcibly abducted and brought to the United States); Alvarez-Machain v. United
States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that Alvarez-Machain had offensive
remedies available under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act).
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the Supreme Court will sustain the right to an offensive
remedy. The Court accepted certiorari in December 2003 and will hear the cases in Spring 2004.
United States. v. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 821
1373
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disturbing situation has occurred because the courts first legitimized
transborder abductions as a means to apprehend a suspect and then offered an
after-the-fact monetary remedy to the victim.
Throughout history, the United States has used varying forms of irregular
rendition to bring foreign criminal defendants into the United States to stand
trial.3 Such abductions occur outside the contours of any existing extradition
treaty between the nation states. This has caused an outcry from the
international community in certain circumstances. Although abduction might
be a somewhat efficient way to bring criminals to justice, it violates a nation’s
territorial sovereignty, the victim’s personal rights, and the integrity of the
international legal process. In addition, transborder abductions affect the
abducting state’s reputation in the international community because such
abductions transgress the formal extradition process. The practice of
transborder abductions represents a great paradox in U.S. foreign policy
because the United States makes all attempts to stop the abduction of its own
citizens yet excuses the use of kidnapping to accomplish its own goals.4
Despite the negative implications, the United States Supreme Court has
upheld in personam jurisdiction and the legality of transborder abductions
through the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.5 Through this controversial doctrine, courts
(Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-485); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, 124 S.Ct. 807 (Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-339).
3. Professor Bassiouni explains that there are two categories of irregular rendition:
(1) abduction of a person by the agents of a state other than the one in which he is present,
with or without the knowledge or consent of the state of refuge; and
(2) seizure of a person by the agents of the state where he is present and his surrender to
the agents of another state outside of formal or legal process.
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE
249 (4th ed. 2002).
4. Even a Legal Advisor to the State Department acknowledged the paradoxical nature of
the United States position regarding transborder abductions: “[H]ow would we feel if some
foreign nation . . . came over here and seized some terrorist suspect in New York City . . . because
we refused through the normal channels of international, legal communications, to extradite that
individual?” Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 679 n.21 (1992). A Senate Resolution proposed by
Senator Moynihan recognized this absurdity after the Alvarez-Machain decision:
Whereas, as a result of certain actions taken by United States officials and the recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States v. AlvarezMachain other nations may believe that the United States accepts the international legality
of kidnapping;
...
be it [r]esolved by the Senate, that: (1) Anyone who attempts to kidnap a person in the
United States for the purpose of bringing that person to trial abroad should be deemed to
have committed a crime in the United States and dealt with accordingly . . . .
S. Res. 310, 102d Cong. (1992).
5. The principle is embodied in two Supreme Court cases: Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886) and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Frisbie can be distinguished from AlvarezMachain as it was a domestic kidnapping case in which a suspect was abducted by Michigan
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have jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of how he was brought before the
court.6 In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court applied the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine in the strictest sense and condoned forcible transborder abductions as
a means to gain custody of a suspect even when an extradition treaty exists
between the countries.7
The decision caused outrage throughout much of the international
community for a multitude of reasons.8 Many nations feared that their
nationals would be kidnapped by the United States and felt that such unilateral
action violated their territorial sovereignty.9 The Alvarez-Machain decision
was also condemned because the Supreme Court simply dismissed the
contention that international law might prohibit such unilateral state action.
Nonetheless, most of the criticisms revolved around the fact that the United
States domestic legal system should have provided a defensive remedy for
Alvarez-Machain by dismissing the indictment. Rather than dismissing the
indictment, however, the U.S. court system has provided him with an after-thefact monetary remedy.
A defensive remedy, essentially dismissal of the indictment, maintains the
highest level of judicial integrity, deters future government misconduct, and
compensates the victim by restoring the victim’s liberty and freedom. On the
other hand, an offensive remedy, when not coupled with a defensive remedy,
effectively condones government misconduct, as it allows the government to
keep the fruits of its illegality, and cannot restore a victim’s intangible rights.
The purpose of this Note, therefore, is to show that a case against an abducted
individual should be dismissed and the individual should be repatriated to his
or her home State because dismissal is the only appropriate and adequate
remedy to restore the victim to the status quo ante.
Part II of this Note reviews the history of the Alvarez-Machain case, which
began in 1990. It discusses the background facts of the case, the criminal case,
and the civil case up to this point in 2004. Part III considers the international
community’s response to forcible transborder abductions and the appropriate
officials in the state of Illinois. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520. Ker, on the other hand, involved the
abduction of the suspect from Peru to the United States; the difference between Ker and AlvarezMachain is that the kidnapper was acting “without any pretence of authority under the treaty or
from the government of the United States.” Ker, 119 U.S. at 443. As John Kester observed when
describing the doctrine, “[b]ecause lawyers have found this canard so intriguing and memorable,
it often slips into judicial decisions. That should not be allowed to continue.” John G. Kester,
Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1449-50 (1988) (footnote
omitted).
6. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440-44; Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522.
7. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657-62.
8. For example, the United Nations and the Organization of American States both
condemned the decision. See infra Part III.A.
9. Many governments expressly condemned the decision and stated that a kidnapping of
their national would be viewed as a criminal act. See infra Part III.B.
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remedy under international law. Part IV examines the possible defensive and
offensive remedies available to an abducted individual. Specifically, it
explores dismissal of the indictment, the exclusionary rule, the Alien Tort
Claims Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. Part V evaluates policy
objectives announced in various U.S. Supreme Court decisions, such as
judicial integrity, deterrence of government misconduct, and victim
compensation. It also rebuts the two main objections to providing a defensive
remedy: (1) that it undermines effective law enforcement and (2) that the
judiciary should not involve itself in matters concerning international relations
and political questions.
II. HISTORY OF THE ALVAREZ-MACHAIN CASE
There are several background facts that must first be established before
discussion of the Alvarez-Machain case. First, there was a significant increase
within the United States’ borders in drug trafficking operations by Mexican
cartels in the 1980s.10 This, in turn, caused the United States to launch its socalled War on Drugs.11 As a result of the Mexican cartels and the War on
Drugs, the United States began placing D.E.A. (Drug Enforcement Agency)
agents in Mexico to help eradicate the cartels and their plantations. In addition
to these factors, there has also been an increase in terrorism in the United
States in the past decade, which has caused the government to take
extraordinary measures, in some circumstances, to bring criminals to justice.
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “[i]n the midst of contemporary
anxiety about the struggle against global terrorism, there is a natural concern
about the reach and limitations of our political branches in bringing
international criminals to justice.”12
A.

Background Facts

Enrique Camarena-Salazar was a D.E.A. agent who was assigned to
Mexico to bring Mexican drug traffickers to justice and to identify political
corruption within the Mexican drug program.13 He played a role in the
eradication of several marijuana plantations. As a result of his involvement in
10. William J. Aceves, The Legality of Transborder Abductions: A Study of United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 3 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 101, 104 (1996).
11. Melanie R. Hallums, Note, Bolivia and Coca: Law, Policy, and Drug Control, 30 VAND.
J. OF TRANSNAT’L. L. 817, 835 (1997). In 1973, President Nixon proclaimed an “all-out, global
war on the drug menace.” Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN.
L. REV. 571, 574 (1995) (quoting the President’s Message to Congress Transmitting
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Establishing a Drug Enforcement Administration, H.R. Doc.
No. 69 (1973)). Despite the professed War on Drugs, the market for illegal drugs has
substantially increased in the United States and throughout the world. Hallums, supra at 819.
12. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
13. Aceves, supra note 10, at 104-05.
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these efforts, Camarena was kidnapped by Mexican drug traffickers outside the
American consulate in Guadalajara, Mexico on February 7, 1985.14 Camarena
was subsequently taken to a house where he was tortured, interrogated, and
eventually murdered.15 He was repeatedly revived throughout the torture so
that the interrogation and torture could continue.16 Camarena’s body was
found a month later with that of a Mexican pilot who had assisted him in aerial
reconnaissance of marijuana fields in Mexico.17
Following the discovery of Camarena’s body, the D.E.A. and the Mexican
government separately initiated operations to investigate his murder and bring
the people responsible for his death to justice.18 Although twenty-eight
Mexican nationals were convicted in Mexico for their involvement in
Camarena’s murder, not all suspects were detained. One of those released was
Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain.19 The United States had received information
that Alvarez-Machain administered lidocaine to Camarena in order to revive
him throughout his torture and interrogation.20
An indictment was issued on January 31, 1990 in the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California that charged Alvarez-Machain, along with
other Mexican nationals, with federal crimes relating to the Camarena
murder.21 Nevertheless, the United States never made any attempt to formally
extradite Alvarez-Machain. Rather, the D.E.A. initiated informal negotiations
with several Mexican officials to abduct and bring him into the United States.
Specifically, the D.E.A. offered a $50,000 reward and expenses to deliver
Alvarez-Machain.22
Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped by “[f]ive or six armed men” from his
office in Guadalajara by Mexican nationals on April 2, 1990.23 He was held
for approximately twenty hours in Mexico, where he was physically and
verbally abused before being handed over to the D.E.A. in El Paso, Texas.24

14. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d sub
nom. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 665 (1992).
15. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 609.
16. See Jim Newton, Camarena’s Abduction and Torture Described; Courts: Former
Bodyguard Says Ranking Mexican Officials were at the House Where U.S. Drug Agent was
Killed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at B1.
17. Id.
18. Aceves, supra note 10, at 105.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 105-06.
21. Id.
22. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d sub nom.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 665 (1992).
23. Id. at 603.
24. Aceves, supra note 10, at 107.
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Alvarez-Machain testified that he was “shocked six or seven times through the
soles of his shoes with . . . ‘an electric shock apparatus’. . . [and] injected twice
with a substance that made him feel ‘light-headed and dizzy.’”25 After
receiving medical treatment in El Paso for one week, he was transferred to Los
Angeles for arraignment before the U.S. District Court for the Central District
of California.26
B.

Procedural History of Alvarez-Machain
1.

The Criminal Case

Alvarez-Machain filed a motion to dismiss in the district court for lack of
personal jurisdiction and outrageous government conduct.27 Relying on the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine, the court rejected his due process claim, stating that “the
Supreme Court established the long standing rule of law that a forcible
abduction does not offend due process and does not require that a court dismiss
an indictment for the loss of jurisdiction on those grounds.”28 Nevertheless,
the court found merit in Alvarez-Machain’s argument that his forcible
abduction violated the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty.29 The district

25. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603.
26. Aceves, supra note 10, at 108.
27. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601.
28. Id. at 604. The court did note that exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine had been
allowed when the defendant could establish government conduct “of the most shocking and
outrageous kind.” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir.
1975). However, Alvarez-Machain failed to show this type of abuse because he never reported
any type of mistreatment to the doctors that examined him upon arrival in El Paso. Id. at 605-06.
29. Treaty of Extradition Between United States of America and the United Mexican States,
May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. The Extradition
provides that:
1. - The Contracting Parties agree to mutually extradite, subject to the provisions of this
Treaty, persons who the competent authorities of the requesting Party have charged with
an offense or have found guilty of committing an offense, or are wanted by said
authorities to complete a judicially pronounced penalty of deprivation of liberty for an
offense committed within the territory of the requesting Party.
2. - For an offense committed outside the territory of the requesting Party, the requested
Party shall grant extradition if:
a) its laws would provide for the punishment of such an offense committed in similar
circumstances, or
b) the person sought is a national of the requesting Party, and that Party has jurisdiction
under its own laws to try that person.
Id. at art. 1. The extradition of nationals is governed by Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty, which
provides:
1. - Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the
executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party,
have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.
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court held that Mexico’s express protest of the abduction vested AlvarezMachain’s rights under the extradition treaty.30 The court went on to note that
“[i]t is axiomatic that the United States or Mexico violates its contracting
partner’s sovereignty, and the extradition treaty, when it unilaterally abducts a
person from the territory of its contracting partner without the participation of
or authorization from the contracting partner where the offended state registers
an official protest.”31 As a remedy for the violation, the court ordered the
immediate return of Alvarez-Machain to Mexico.32
The government
subsequently appealed the district court’s decision, and Alvarez-Machain was
not repatriated to Mexico.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling,
relying on its earlier decision in United States v. Verdugo Urquidez.33 In
Verdugo, the court held that the forcible abduction of a Mexican national from
Mexico by United States government officials without Mexico’s consent
violated the Extradition Treaty between the two states.34 The United States

2. - If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested Party
shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided
that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.
Id. at art. 9.
30. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 608.
31. Id. at 610. In addition to the two claims mentioned above, Alvarez-Machain sought
dismissal based on violations of the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of
American States and under the court’s supervisory powers. Id. at 601. Although the court did not
reach these issues, it noted that although the United States’ involvement in the abduction of
Alvarez-Machain appeared to violate the Charter of the United Nations and Charter of the
Organization of American States, “the weight of authority indicates that these international
instruments are not self-executing and therefore are not enforceable in federal courts absent
implementing legislation.” Id. at 614. In addition, the court warned:
[W]e can reach a time when in the interest of establishing and maintaining civilized
standards of procedure and evidence, we may wish to bar jurisdiction in an abduction case
as a matter not of constitutional law but in the exercise of our supervisory power. . . . To
my mind the Government in its laudable interest of stopping the international drug traffic
is by these repeated abductions inviting exercise of that supervisory power in the interest
of the greater good of preserving respect for the law.
Id. at 615 (quoting United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d. Cir. 1975) (Oakes, J., concurring)).
32. Id. at 614.
33. 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
34. Id. at 1350-55. The court observed that forcible abductions violated the purpose of the
Extradition Treaty even though they were not expressly prohibited by it. In particular, the Ninth
Circuit held:
[E]xtradition treaties provide a comprehensive means of regulating the methods by which
one nation may remove an individual from another nation for the purpose of subjecting
him to criminal prosecution, and that unless the nation from which an individual has been
forcibly abducted consents to that action in advance, or subsequently by its silence or
otherwise waives its right to object, a government authorized or sponsored abduction
constitutes a breach of the treaty. To hold to the contrary would seriously undermine the
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government again appealed this decision, and the Supreme Court granted the
petition for certiorari.
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court first reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
because “[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a
guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to
trial against his will.”35 The Court held that the district court had jurisdiction
to try Alvarez-Machain even though he had been forcibly abducted from
Mexico because the Extradition Treaty did not prohibit such action.36
The Court considered both the express language and the implications of the
treaty. The Court first concluded that the “Treaty says nothing about the
obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from forcible abductions
of people from the territory of the other nation, or the consequences under the
Treaty if such an abduction occurs.”37 The Court next examined AlvarezMachain’s argument that the Treaty needed to be examined in the context of
customary international law. The majority found that while Alvarez-Machain’s
abduction might have been “shocking” and in “violation of general
international law principles,” it did not violate the Extradition Treaty and, as
such, did not prohibit his prosecution.38
Justice Stevens’s dissent provided a stark contrast to the majority opinion.
He seemed to be appalled by the government conduct and the majority’s
approval of it.39 First, Justice Stevens noted that the Treaty “appears to have

utility and vitality not only of our extradition treaty with Mexico but of all of our
extradition treaties.
Id. at 1355. The court’s holding and decision to repatriate the defendant were based on “general
principles of international law.” Id. at 1351-52.
35. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992).
36. Id. at 660-70.
37. Id. at 663. The Supreme Court further elaborated that the Mexican government was
aware of the Ker doctrine as early as 1906 and the United States position as to forcible abductions
and a court’s jurisdiction. The Court found that despite Mexico’s knowledge, “the current
version of the Treaty . . . does not attempt to establish a rule that would in any way curtail the
effect of Ker. Id. at 665. Nevertheless, Mexico is not obligated to rely on United States domestic
courts’ interpretations of legal doctrines, and it would be more reasonable for Mexico to rely on
its own courts’ interpretations of international law. However, it would make the most sense for
the countries to rely on an interpretation by an international body like the International Court of
Justice or the United Nations. Hernan De J. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping is
Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 865 (1993).
38. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669-70. However, “[k]idnapping is against the nature,
purpose, and goals of the Extradition Treaty. Although fast and effective, kidnapping sidesteps
the safeguards described in the Extradition Treaty to protect individual human rights and asylum
country sovereignty.” Ruiz-Bravo, supra note 37, at 860.
39. Justices Blackmun and O’Connor joined in the dissent. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at
670-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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been designed to cover the entire subject of extradition.”40 The dissent further
elaborated that “[i]t is shocking that a party to an extradition treaty might
believe that it has secretly reserved the right to make seizures of citizens in the
other party’s territory.”41 As support for his contentions, Justice Stevens stated
various authorities of international law to show that international opinion
condemns forcible abductions as violations of the territorial integrity of
sovereign nations.42
Finally, Justice Stevens warned of the risks that follow from the majority’s
opinion, which it saw as revenge for the murder of an American law
enforcement agent. He noted:
Indeed, the desire for revenge exerts ‘a kind of hydraulic pressure . . . before
which even well settled principles of law will bend,’ but it is precisely at such
moments that we should remember and be guided by our duty ‘to render
judgment evenly and dispassionately according to law, as each is given
understanding to ascertain and apply it.’43

Thus Stevens felt that transborder forcible abductions violate both international
law and the United States’ treaty obligations.
40. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While considering the
purpose of the Extradition Treaty with Mexico, Justice Stevens added that “[i]t is difficult to see
how an interpretation that encourages unilateral action could foster cooperation and mutual
assistance—the stated goals of the Treaty.” Id. at 673, n.4. He went on to observe that provisions
of the Treaty “would serve little purpose if the requesting country could simply kidnap the
person. . . . ‘[E]ach of these provisions would be utterly frustrated if a kidnapping were held to
be a permissible course of governmental conduct.’” Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1349 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United States v. AlvarezMachain, 504 U.S. 665 (1992)).
41. Id. at 678-79.
42. Id. at 678-81. In particular, Justice Stevens considered the Charter of the Organization
of American States, numerous provisions of the United Nations Charter, Oppenheim’s
International Law, and the American Law Institute’s Restatement of Foreign Relations. The chief
reporter for the Restatement of Foreign Relations states:
[w]hen done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person from a
foreign country is a gross violation of international law and gross disrespect for a norm
high in the opinion of mankind. It is a blatant violation of the territorial integrity of
another state; it eviscerates the extradition system. . . .
Id. at 681 (quoting Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 215, 231 (1992) (footnote omitted).
43. Id. at 687 (quoting N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) and United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 342 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)) (citation omitted). Justice Stevens reminds us of Thomas Paine’s warning:
an “avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty” because it leads a nation “to stretch,
to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws.” “He that would make his own
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he
establishes a precedent that will reach to himself.”
Id. at 688 (quoting 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945))
(footnote omitted).
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On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the issue of whether customary international law alone could justify
the dismissal of the indictment and Alvarez-Machain’s return to Mexico. The
court held that an international customary law exception to the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine has only been recognized “in a situation where the government’s
conduct was outrageous,”44 therefore denying Alvarez-Machain’s motion.
Nevertheless, on remand, the court granted his motion for acquittal, holding
that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. District Court Judge
Rafeedie explained that “the evidence presented against Alvarez had been
based on ‘hunches’ and the ‘wildest speculation’ and had failed to support the
government’s allegations.”45
2.

The Civil Suit

Following the end of the criminal case, Alvarez-Machain filed a civil suit
in U.S. federal district court requesting damages for his abduction and
detention. Alleging civil rights violations and violations under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),46 he filed
claims against the United States, the D.E.A. agents who abducted him, a
former Mexican policeman, and Mexican civilians. Alvarez-Machain’s claims
first reached the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2001, and a three-judge
panel rendered an opinion. The case was subsequently reheard by the Court of
Appeals en banc, which submitted an opinion in June 2003.
The three-judge panel held that Alvarez-Machain’s kidnapping was a
violation of the law of nations, as required by the ATCA, because it violated
customary international human rights law.47 In particular, the panel found that
“[a]lthough no international human rights instruments refers to transborder

44. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992). For detailed
information on this exception, see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974)
(finding that a court should not have jurisdiction over a defendant when he has been forcibly
abducted and subjected to torture and abuse at the behest of the U.S. government); United States
v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 901-02 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the misconduct of the government
agent must reach the level of “gross mistreatment” in order for a court to divest itself of
jurisdiction following a transborder abduction).
45. Aceves, supra note 10, at 116.
46. See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003); see also AlvarezMachain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1997). Specifically, he alleged the following
tort claims: (1) kidnapping; (2) torture; (3) cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment; (4) arbitrary detention; (5) assault and battery; (6) false imprisonment; (7) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (8) false arrest; (9) negligent employment; and (10) negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 610 n.1.
47. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’d en banc,
331 F.3d 604 (2003). As background, the ATCA provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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abduction specifically,” various international human rights norms encompass
it, such as “the rights to freedom of movement, to remain in one’s country, and
to security in one’s person.”48 It further held that the detention of AlvarezMachain violated the international customary legal norm against arbitrary
detention.49 “[D]etention is arbitrary if ‘it is not pursuant to law; it may be
arbitrary also if it is incompatible with the principles of justice or with the
dignity of the human person.’”50 The three-judge panel noted that the arrest
was only arbitrary while he was held in Mexico because the lawful arrest
warrant and indictment issued in the United States “broke the chain of
causation.”51
The three-judge panel also held that neither the foreign activities
exception, nor the intentional torts exception applied to Alvarez-Machain’s
FTCA claim.52 The foreign activities exception did not apply because
Alvarez-Machain asserted a valid “headquarters claim.” Under the
“headquarters doctrine,” the FTCA requires courts to “look at the law of the
place where the act took place, rather than the place where the act had its
operative effect.”53 The three-judge panel found that all of the command
decisions about the abduction occurred in the United States even though the
actual kidnapping took place in Mexico.54 In addition, the panel found that the
intentional torts exception did not apply because investigative or law
enforcement officers committed the torts.55 After this decision was rendered in

48. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1051. The three-judge panel specifically considered the
American Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man. Id. at 1051-52.
49. Id. at 1052.
50. Id. (quoting Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998)).
51. Id. at 1063.
52. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1054-57. The foreign activities exception to the FTCA
means that the Act does not apply to “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.” 28 U.S.C. §
2680(k) (2000). The intentional torts exception states that the FTCA does not apply to:
[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter
and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the
enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, ‘investigative or
law enforcement officer’ means any officer of the United States who is empowered by
law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal
law.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
53. Alvarez-Machain, 266 F.3d at 1054.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1056.
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2001, however, a majority of nonrecused judges of the Ninth Circuit voted to
rehear the case en banc.56
In considering Alvarez-Machain’s claims, the court first held that AlvarezMachain lacked standing to assert Mexico’s interests in its territorial
sovereignty because the ATCA does not allow an individual to defend the
rights of a foreign country.57 The court next reached the issue of transborder
abduction and customary international law. It found that the “United States
does not recognize a prohibition against transborder kidnapping, nor can it be
said that there is international acceptance of such a norm.”58 The Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, did not find the previous three-judge panel’s opinion
that the restriction of an individual’s right to freedom of movement and
security of person translated into a right to be free from forcible transborder
abductions. The court found that such general prohibitions are insufficient to
support a claim under the ATCA because the ATCA requires a “specific,
universal, and obligatory” violation of the laws of nations.59
Despite this setback for Alvarez-Machain, the Court of Appeals held that
there was an international norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention.60
The court reiterated the three-judge panel’s definition of arbitrary detention
and stated that the norm is against arbitrary detention—not pursuant to the
law—and does not have a temporal element to it.61 Applying the standard to
Alvarez-Machain, the court held that “there was, quite simply, no basis in law
for the unilateral extraterritorial arrest and related detention of Alvarez in
Mexico.”62 The court did not find the argument that the United States had an
arrest warrant for Alvarez-Machain persuasive because a federal arrest warrant
does not operate as a license to effectuate arrests throughout the world.63
Likewise, the court was not persuaded by the argument that it lacked
jurisdiction over the defendants because the incident occurred outside the
United States. Instead, the court stated that it was this same principle of
extraterritoriality that caused the Supreme Court to conclude that AlvarezMachain could be tried in the United States.64 Along the same lines, the court
importantly noted that “[e]xtraterritorial application . . . does not automatically

56. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 284 F.3d 1039, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 616 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
58. Id. at 617.
59. Id. at 619.
60. Id. at 620. The court found that the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention is
“codified in every major comprehensive human rights instrument and is reflected in at least 119
national constitutions.” Id.
61. Id. at 621.
62. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 623.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 624.
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give rise to extraterritorial enforcement authority.”65 In looking at the statutes
relating to the D.E.A., it found that D.E.A. agents are granted felony arrest
power, but that no language in the statute allows this power to go beyond the
borders of the United States.66 In conclusion, the court held that the arrest and
detention of Alvarez-Machain were arbitrary because they were not pursuant to
law. There was no basis in law for the D.E.A.’s actions, and a warrant issued
by a United States court cannot authorize extraterritorial abductions of
defendants.67
The court agreed with the three-judge panel’s assessment of AlvarezMachain’s FTCA claim and held that neither the foreign activities exception
nor the intentional tort exception applied.68 In addition, the court agreed that
the United States should be substituted for the individual D.E.A. agents under
the FTCA.69 Alvarez-Machain succeeded on his ATCA claim against Sosa,
the Mexican policeman who kidnapped him, and on the FTCA claim against
the United States at the Court of Appeals. However, the Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari on petitions from the United States and Sosa.70
Four separate issues are raised between the two petitions. In the case
regarding the United States, the Court is asked to decide whether federal law
enforcement officers have the authority to arrest an indicted suspect in a
foreign country.71 In addition, the Court will decide whether a suspect arrested
in another country can bring an action under the FTCA for false arrest,
notwithstanding the FTCA’s foreign activities exception.72

65. Id. at 625.
66. Id. at 626. In addition, “an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains.” (quoting Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)).
67. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 623-26.
68. Id. at 638-40.
69. Alvarez-Machain’s ATCA claim against the United States failed because of the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, which provides that the exclusive
remedy for the wrongful act of a federal employee acting within the scope of his duties and
against the United States is through the FTCA. Id. at 631.
70. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-485); Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 124 S.Ct. 807 (Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-339).
71. Petition of United States, at I, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (2003)
(No. 03-485). Interestingly enough, the Bush administration has turned the case into one about
the war on terrorism, rather than focusing on the smaller issue of the specific DEA agents
involved in the case. In the petition for certiorari, the government claims that the Ninth Circuit’s
holding “threatens the government’s ability to conduct necessary law enforcement operations
abroad to combat terrorism, international crime, and the flow of illegal drugs into the United
States.” Id. at 15. However, as Respondent’s brief points out, “[t]his case is not about . . . the
war on terrorism,” and the “United States is simply using the war on terrorism as a subterfuge to
ask [the] Court to involve itself in an unrelated dispute.” Brief in Opposition to Petition of United
States, at 14, 16, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (2003) (No. 03-485).
72. Petition of United States, at I, Alvarez-Machain, (No. 03-485).
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The more anticipated questions are raised by Sosa’s petition, which
presents questions about the legitimacy and scope of the ATCA.73 First, the
Court must decide whether the ATCA creates a private cause of action or
instead is merely a jurisdiction-granting statute that does not establish a private
right of action.74 If the Court finds that the ATCA does establish a private
cause of action, it must then decide if the arrest of Alvarez-Machain in Mexico
is actionable under the statute.75
III. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOLLOWING ALVAREZMACHAIN
There was international outrage following the Supreme Court’s AlvarezMachain decision. Governments and scholars alike expressed extreme
disagreement and disgust with the Court’s disrespect and disregard for
principles of international law.76 Despite the United States’ adherence to the
principle of “mala captus bene detentus,”77 there is international precedent that

73. These questions are more anticipated as they relate to the hotly debated ATCA. With the
increasing appearance of the ATCA in litigation, there is a split of opinions as to the efficacy and
legitimacy of the statute. Robert Bork, a former Supreme Court nominee, complained that an
unholy alliance of imperialistic judges and a leftish cadre of international law professors “[have]
turned this same statute into a tool for ‘judicial imperialism.’” Daphne Eviatar, Judgment Day:
Will an Obscure Law Bring Down the Global Economy?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 28, 2003, at D1.
On the other hand, the executive director of Human Rights Watch considers opinions like Bork’s
to be “a craven attempt to protect human rights abusers at the expense of victims.” Id.
74. Brief for the United States at I, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 807 (2003) (No. 03339). The United States contends that the ATCA does not establish a private cause of action.
Nevertheless, the U.S. government, in its official submission to the U.N. Committee Against
Torture, described the ATCA as a statute that provides a right of action for civil damages for
torture occurring in a foreign territory. Specifically, the government stated that the ATCA
“represents an early effort to provide a judicial remedy to individuals whose rights have been
violated under international law.” Brief for Alvarez-Machain at 16, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
124 S.Ct. 807 (2003) (No. 03-339). For more detail of how the United States has repeatedly
contradicted their apparent opposition to the ATCA, see id.
75. Brief for the United States at I, Sosa (No. 03-339).
76. Indeed, the United States Senate proposed a resolution out of concern for the
international implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain. See S. Res. 319,
102d Cong. (1992). The resolution first recognized that other nations might think that the U.S.
accepts the legality of kidnapping. Id. It then stated that criminals should be pursued “through
the existing international legal framework, including extradition treaties; and,[the] United States
officials should refrain from committing the crime of kidnapping which weakens international
cooperation against crime, encourages the abduction of American citizens and subverts respect
for the rule of law.” Id; see Mark S. Zaid, Military Might Versus Sovereign Right: The
Kidnapping of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain and the Resulting Fallout, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
829 (1997).
77. Professor Bassiouni describes this maxim as the process whereby “national courts will
assert in personam jurisdiction without inquiring into the means by which the presence of the
defendant was secured.” BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 250.
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transborder abductions violate international law when the abducting country
detains and tries the victim. This Section reviews this precedent and considers
the international community’s response when such an abduction occurs.
A.

History of International Condemnation of Transborder Abductions

The international community condemned transborder abductions prior to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain. The United Nations
Security Council has criticized state-sponsored abductions twice. The first
occurred after Israel abducted a Nazi official, Adolf Eichmann, from Argentina
on charges of crimes against humanity during World War II.78 Argentina
petitioned the Security Council requesting Eichmann’s return and for the
punishment of the abductors. The Council adopted a resolution stating that
Israel violated Argentina’s sovereignty and requested the “Government of
Israel to make appropriate reparation.”79
On a more general level, the Security Council has acknowledged that
“abductions are offenses of grave concern to the international community,
having severe adverse consequences for the rights of the victims and for the
promotion of friendly relations and cooperation among States,” and has
condemned “unequivocally all acts of . . . abduction.”80 Thus, it is apparent
that the United Nations body charged with maintaining international peace and
security condemns transborder abductions.
In a more recent case, the South African Supreme Court ordered the
release of a defendant abducted from Swaziland after finding that the court
lacked jurisdiction due to the forcible transborder abduction.81 In that case,
South African authorities forcibly abducted Ebrahim from Swaziland despite
an extradition treaty between the two countries.82 The South African Supreme
Court held that a court lacks jurisdiction to try a person kidnapped from a
foreign territory by state actors.83
Basing the decision on Roman-Dutch law, the South African Supreme
Court reasoned that a person “must be protected against illegal detention and

78. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 5 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem 1961)
(summary, A. Munkman), aff’d, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Supp. Ct. Isr. 1962).
79. S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).
80. S.C. Res. 579, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (1986).
81. South Africa: Supreme Court (Appellate Division) Opinion in State v. Ebrahim
(Jurisdiction Over Abducted Person) February 16, 1991, 31 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS JUD. &
SIMILAR PROC. 888 (John Dugard ed. 1992) [hereinafter Dugard]. Justice Stevens referred to this
decision in his dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Machain. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655,
687 (1992). While considering Ebrahim, Stevens noted that “[t]he Court of Appeal of South
Africa—indeed, I suspect most courts throughout the civilized world—will be deeply disturbed
by the ‘monstrous’ decision the Court announces today.” Id.
82. Dugard, supra note 81, at 890-91.
83. Id. at 899.
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abduction, the bounds of jurisdiction must not be exceeded, sovereignty must
be respected, the legal process must be fair to those affected and abuse of law
must be avoided in order to protect and promote the integrity of the
administration of justice.”84 The Ebrahim court also referenced United States
v. Toscanino85 and agreed with the outcome of the case.86 In addition to
having the case dismissed, Ebrahim received compensation for the abduction
in a civil case.87 Although the Ebrahim decision is based more on municipal
law than international law, it still represents an important precedent because it
indicates a movement of customary international law toward prohibiting
jurisdiction over an individual abducted from another nation.
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has also held that transborder
abductions violate Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).88 In the case of Lilian Celiberti de Casariego, a
Uruguayan/Italian citizen was forcibly abducted from an apartment in Brazil
by Uruguayan agents on suspicion of “subversive association” and taken into

84. Id. at 896. The court also noted that “[w]hen the state is a party to a dispute, as for
example in criminal cases, it must come to court with ‘clean hands.’ When the state itself is
involved in an abduction across international borders, as in the present case, its hands are not
clean.” Id.
85. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
86. Id. at 896-97. In Toscanino, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a court
should “divest itself of jurisdiction” after a transborder abduction “where it has been acquired as
the result of the government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s
constitutional rights.” Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275; see infra notes 134-38 and accompanying
text.
87. Ebrahim v. Minister of Law and Order, 1993 (2) SA 559 (C).
88. “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. . . . No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established
by law.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976). Because the United States did not adopt a reservation to Article 9(1), if a
transborder abduction like that of Alvarez-Machain occurred in the future, the defendant could
raise Article 9(1) as a defense to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. David Sloss, The Domestication
of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 196 (1999). However, the United States did not ratify the Optional
Protocol of the ICCPR, which gives the HRC jurisdiction to hear cases. Therefore, the HRC
cannot hear a case in which the U.S. is a party. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 236. The HRC has
also found countries in violation of the ICCPR for abductions even though they only assisted in
the abduction. In one case, a Colombian citizen was abducted in Ecuador at the command of the
United States DEA and deported to the United States. Although no action could be brought
against the United States, the HRC found that Ecuador was in violation of ICCPR Article 9(1).
Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Forty-third Session, Cañón Garcia v.
Ecuador, Human Rights Committee, 43d Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/319/1988
(1991).
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Uruguay.89 The HRC held that the abduction violated Article 9(1) of the
ICCPR, as it constituted an arbitrary arrest and detention and ordered that
Celiberti de Casariego be immediately released from custody, compensated for
violations, and allowed to leave the country.90
Thus before the abduction of Alvarez-Machain, it was clear that
transborder abductions violated international law. 91 Furthermore, international
law has acknowledged that the correct remedy is to repatriate the victim and
offer monetary compensation. Because this is the norm, the next section will
detail how the international community reacted to the Supreme Court’s
decision to lend more credence to the conception that transborder abductions
violate international law.
B.

International Response to Alvarez-Machain

Not surprisingly, the Mexican government was highly critical of the
Supreme Court’s decision because its territorial sovereignty and the personal
liberty of its citizen had been disregarded by the highest court of the United
States.92 The Mexican Foreign Ministry criticized the decision as
“transgressing basic principles of international law.”93 The Mexican
government felt that the extradition treaty was the only legitimate way to
apprehend a suspect and temporarily suspended cooperation with D.E.A.
agents in Mexico.94 However, negotiations between the United States and
Mexico led to the signing of the Transborder Abduction Treaty in 1994, which
suggests an effort by both countries towards improvement in extradition

89. Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, R.13/56, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc.
A/36/40 (1981), at 185, reprinted in 68 I.L.R. 41 (1981).
90. Id; see Lopez v. Uruguay, R.12/52, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/36/40
(1981), at 76, reprinted in 68 I.L.R. 29 (1981) (holding that the transborder of a Uruguayan
national from Argentina by Uruguayan agents violated Article 9(1) and ordering his immediate
release and compensation).
91. The State Department Legal Adviser noted that it is important for the judiciary to
consider international law and implications:
Specifically, we believe that both the administration of justice and the foreign relations of
the United States are best served when the United States courts take into consideration the
views of foreign governments on issues of concern to them. It is important that courts be
made aware of the international implications of their decisions and that they give
appropriate weight to these considerations in the process of making their decisions.
CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 318 (2003).
92. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the Mexican Foreign Minister held a press
conference in which, among other things, it called the decision “invalid and illegal” and
demanded the repatriation of Alvarez-Machain. Zaid, supra note 76, at 842.
93. David Clark Scott, U.S. Court Ruling Provokes Heated Mexican Retort, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 17, 1992, at 1.
94. Id.; Tim Golden, Mexicans Mollified Over Drug Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1992, at
A3.
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policies.95 Most importantly, the remedy for a violation of the Treaty is
repatriation of the abductee.96
In response to the Alvarez-Machain decision, the Inter-American Juridical
Committee of the Organization of American States (OAS) found that the
abduction violated Mexico’s territorial sovereignty and that the United States’
refusal to repatriate Alvarez-Machain was a further violation of Mexico’s
territorial sovereignty.97 The Committee emphasized “the incompatibility of
the practice of abduction with the right of due process to which every person is
entitled, no matter how serious the crime they are accused of, a right protected
by international law.”98 The Committee was of the opinion that AlvarezMachain’s personal rights were violated by the abduction and that this violated
international law. In addition, the participants of the Ibero-American Summit
Conference requested the U.N. General Assembly to present an issue to the
International Court of Justice for an Advisory Opinion on the legality of
transborder abductions.99
The U.N. General Assembly agreed that international law prohibits a State
from exercising its jurisdiction beyond its borders because it violates the
territorial integrity and sovereign equality of States.100 It decided that
95. Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, Nov. 23, 1994, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059,
reprinted in MICHAEL ABBEL & BRUNO A. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE,
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION A-676.3 (Vol. 5 1995 & Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Transborder
Abduction Treaty]. The Treaty provides:
[t]he purpose of this Treaty is to prohibit transborder abductions.
...
The Parties shall not conduct transborder abductions.
...
For the purposes of this Treaty, a “transborder abduction” occurs when a person is
removed from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party:
(a) By force or threat of force; and
(b) By federal, state or local government officials of the Party to whose territory the
person is taken, or by private individuals acting under the direction of such officials.
...
Individuals responsible for transborder abductions shall be subject to prosecution in
accordance with the laws of the Requesting and Requested Parties.
Transborder Abduction Treaty, at art. 1, 2, 3(1), 6(1).
96. Id. at art. 5(1). However, “[t]he obligation to repatriate shall not apply if (a) the
Requesting Party does not make an explicit request for repatriation, or (b) the abducted person
opposes repatriation.” Id. at art. 5(2). Neither the Treaty itself, nor a violation of it creates private
rights for individuals. Id. at art. 7.
97. Legal Opinion on the Decision of the US Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case,
CP/RES 586 (909/92), Inter-Am. Juridical Committee Doc. CJI/RES.II-15/92, reprinted in 13
HUM. RTS. L.J. 395, 396 (1992).
98. Id. at 5, reprinted in 13 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 397.
99. Aceves, supra note 10, at 121.
100. Virginia Morris & M. Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrailas, The Work of the Sixth Committee
at the Forty-Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 343, 357-58 (1994).
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transborder abductions undermine existing mechanisms for international
cooperation in the apprehension of criminals and extradition treaties.101 The
U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention also determined that transborder
abductions violate international customary law.102 In particular, the Working
Group found that:
[N]o legal basis whatsoever can be found to justify the deprivation of freedom
from the date of the abduction - 2 April 1990 - until his release on 14
December 1992 since this deprivation of freedom took place without the orders
of any authority whatsoever and, indeed, both the District Court and the Court
of Appeals declared it unlawful.103

The Working Group, thus, declared that the United States’ position with regard
to transborder abductions is mistaken and violates customary international law.
In addition to the U.N. declaration, several nations issued statements
expressly condemning the Supreme Court’s decision.104 The decision was
referred to as “an historic regression in criminal law,” and one government
claimed “the ruling allows the United States government to ‘solve a crime with
a crime.’”105 A few nations stated that an abduction within their territory
would be regarded as a criminal act and as a violation of any extradition treaty
in place.106 The Costa Rican Supreme Court issued a statement regarding the
decision stating:
Legaliz(ing) abduction by other States’ officials to bring the abducted before
the courts of such country, is not only contrary to modern times, but is against
the ideals it forged upon the principles of respect to freedom and human
dignity, is against the ideals of independence of that nation, and infringes its
highest principles and those of the rest of nations, that have the natural right to
protect its inhabitants and to judge them according to due process. . . .107

101. Id.
102. Question of the Human Rights of all Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, U. N. Commission on
Human Rights, 48/1993, at ¶¶ 5(n)-(p), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27 (1993).
103. Id. at ¶ 5(r).
104. Zaid, supra note 76, at 840-58. See Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction Over
Persons Abducted in Violation of International Law in the Aftermath of United States v. AlvarezMachain, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205, 235-38 (1998).
105. Zaid, supra note 76, at 844, 852. In reference to the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Swiss
Justice Ministry spokesman commented, “[i]magine where it would lead if every country would
do that. You would have anarchy.” Id. at 852.
106. See id. at 844-53.
107. Id. at 848 (alteration in original). The Cuban government released a statement regarding
Alvarez-Machain, which stated:
[t]he decision of the highest North American court, now controlled by
ultraconservatives and racists, defines its character as an instrument of the imperialist
policy and proves evident the falsehood of the pretended independence of the Judicial
Power in that country.
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It is clear from these views that many countries consider any attempt at a
forcible transborder abduction as a violation of their territorial sovereignty, the
victim’s personal rights, and principles of international law. As such, it is clear
the United States’ policy on carrying out transborder abductions stands in stark
contrast to the views of the rest of the world.
C. Two Violations of International Law: Abduction and Failure to Provide a
Defensive Remedy
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in the LaGrand case that not
only did the United States violate international legal obligations under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by not ensuring the LaGrands’
rights under the Convention, but it also violated international law by failing to
provide a remedy for the violation of these rights.108 Under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (“Vienna Convention”), a state is required
to inform a foreigner of his right to contact his consulate.109 The consulate has
a right to visit the prisoner who is in custody, “to correspond with him and to
arrange for his legal representation.”110
In LaGrand, two German nationals were convicted and sentenced to death
in the United States without receiving notification of their rights as required
under the Vienna Convention.111 The ICJ released a provisional measure
requesting that the United States stay the execution of the LaGrand brothers
pending its final decision.112 Nevertheless, the United States executed the two
brothers.113
The ICJ first recognized that the Convention “creates individual rights”
and that the “laws and regulations [of the U.S.] . . . must enable full effect to be
given to the purposes for which the rights . . . [of the foreign national] are
intended.”114 The Court then found that the “procedural default rule” violated
The Government of the Republic of Cuba reaffirms that national sovereignty is
inviolable and that it can not be questioned, nor belittled by false decisions of foreign
tribunals and that no state, powerful as it may be, has any authority whatsoever to ignore
the rules of law and to act as if it owned the world.
Id. at 849.
108. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. at ¶ 128 (June 27).
109. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24,
1963, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77. The Convention was enacted to develop friendly relations
among nation-states and to provide for more efficient consulate functioning.
110. Id. at art. 36(1)(c).
111. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at ¶¶ 10-29.
112. Id. at ¶ 29.
113. Id. at ¶¶ 30-34. Although the United States attempted to argue that the provisional
measure was not an order, but a suggestion or request that was not binding on it, the ICJ did not
find this argument persuasive. Id. at ¶¶ 92-109. The Court ultimately held that provisional
measures have a binding effect. Id.
114. Id. at ¶¶ 77, 88.
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the Convention by preventing LaGrand from challenging his conviction and
sentence.115 Finally, the ICJ held:
[A]n apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned have
been subjected to prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe
penalties. In the case of such a conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent
upon the United States to allow the review and reconsideration of the
conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set
forth in the Convention. This obligation can be carried out in various ways.
The choice of means must be left to the United States.116

Thus, the ICJ held that the United States violated international law by
breaching its obligations under the Vienna Convention and by not providing a
defensive remedy to LaGrand.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Torres v. Mullin,117 which
is a case similar to LaGrand. The facts of the case are almost identical to
LaGrand. A Mexican national was convicted and sentenced to death without
being notified of his rights under the Vienna Convention.118 He subsequently
raised the Vienna Convention claim on habeas corpus and the district court
found that he procedurally defaulted the claim under state law.119
Although certiorari was denied, Justices Breyer and Stevens wrote
dissenting opinions from the denial of certiorari. Justice Breyer considered the
ICJ’s decision in LaGrand significant and reasoned that “[g]iven the
international implications of the issues raised . . . further information, analysis,
and consideration are necessary.”120 Justice Stevens noted that “[a]pplying the
procedural default rule to Article 36 claims is not only in direct violation of the
Vienna Convention, but it is also manifestly unfair.”121 Justice Stevens also

115. Id. at ¶¶ 90-91.
116. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J.at ¶ 125.
117. Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2003). Interestingly enough, since the
LaGrand decision, most state and federal courts that have been confronted with an Article 36
claim have not mentioned the ICJ decision or departed from the precedent of denying relief.
Sarah M. Ray, Comment, Domesticating International Obligations: How to Ensure U.S.
Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1753
(2003). One court, however, recognized that the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention in
LaGrand is authoritative: “To disregard one of the I.C.J.’s most significant decisions interpreting
the Vienna Convention would be a decidedly imprudent course. . . . After LaGrand . . . no court
can credibly hold that the Vienna Convention does not create individually enforceable rights.”
U.S. ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, No. 98 C 1866, 2002 WL 31386480, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22,
2002).
118. See Torres, 317 F.3d at 1150.
119. Id.
120. Torres v. Mullin, 124 S.Ct. 562, 565 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. Torres v. Mullin, No. 03-5781, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 8548, at *4 (Nov. 17, 2003) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (respecting the denial of the petition for certiorari).
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observed that the Court is “unfaithful” to the Supremacy Clause “when it
permits state courts to disregard the Nation’s treaty obligations.”122
From LaGrand, it is clear that the United States violates its treaty
obligations by not notifying a foreign national of his or her rights under the
Vienna Convention. It is equally clear that it is a further violation of
international law to not provide a defensive remedy for this violation. The
dissents of Justices Breyer and Stevens are important in that they note the
United States’ treaty obligations and the importance of adhering to them
without violating international law. In addition, they show the binding effect
of the ICJ’s decisions on the United States and recognize that by denying a
defensive remedy to a victim of a Vienna Convention violation, the courts
ignore the Supremacy Clause and the nation’s treaty obligations.
IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIES UNDER UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
As discussed above, the United States violated both international law and
Alvarez-Machain’s internationally protected individual rights when it
kidnapped him. The U.S. judiciary furthered this violation by upholding
jurisdiction. Consequently, the following question arises: What types of
remedies are potentially available in the U.S. legal system for an individual,
like Alvarez-Machain, whose personal rights have been violated? This Part
will discuss the possible defensive and offensive remedies available to a person
in a situation similar to that of Alvarez-Machain.
A.

Defensive Remedies

The defensive remedies that are available in the United States domestic
legal system are dismissal of the indictment or application of the exclusionary
rule to illegally obtained evidence. As shown below, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
prevents dismissal of the indictment, and the exclusionary rule does not apply
because there is no evidence to be excluded.123
1.

Dismissal of the Indictment

The United States has generally upheld in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant even when procured through irregular methods by applying the
maxim “mala captus bene detentus.”124 The two landmark Supreme Court
cases that courts continually rely on to uphold jurisdiction are Ker v. Illinois125
and Frisbie v. Collins.126 The rule from the cases combined has come to be
known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. It stands for the proposition that “criminal
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at *5.
See infra notes 124-53 and accompanying text.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 250.
119 U.S. 436 (1886).
342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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jurisdiction is not impaired by the illegality of the method by which the court
acquires in personam jurisdiction over the relator.”127
In Ker, the defendant was indicted in Illinois for larceny and
embezzlement but was living in Peru at the time of indictment.128 Although a
warrant had been issued for Ker’s arrest, a private citizen forcibly abducted
Ker rather than using the formal extradition process.129 Ker was subsequently
tried and convicted in Illinois. The Supreme Court held that the abduction did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because due
process only requires that the accused be regularly indicted by a grand jury and
brought to “trial according to the forms and modes prescribed for such
trials.”130 The Court upheld Ker’s conviction by holding that Illinois validly
tried him, regardless of the extralegal methods used to acquire control over
him.131
In Frisbie, the defendant, who was living in Chicago, was forcibly seized
by Michigan state officers and returned to stand trial in Michigan.132 The
defendant claimed his conviction violated due process, but the Supreme Court,
relying on Ker, rejected this claim.133 The Court held that “the power of a
court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court’s jurisdiction by reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’”134
There have been only two exceptions to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, one of
which was rendered by the Second Circuit in United States v. Toscanino.135 In
Toscanino, the defendant, an Italian citizen, was forcibly abducted from his

127. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 262.
128. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437-38.
129. Id. at 438. Justice Stevens pointed out the following fatal flaw in the majority’s reliance
on Ker in his Alvarez-Machain dissent: There is a crucial difference between a court’s jurisdiction
over a defendant wrongfully seized by a private citizen, which does not violate any treaty
obligation, and a defendant illegally abducted at the behest of a government whose authority to
act had been limited by a treaty. U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 682-86 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440.
131. Id. The Court found that “but . . . for mere irregularities in the manner in which he may
be brought into custody of the law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried
at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment.” Id.
132. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520 (1952).
133. Id. at 520-22. The Court explained, “[t]his Court has never departed from the rule
announced in [Ker]. . . . There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a
guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his
will.” Id. at 522.
134. Id. at 522.
135. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). The other exception, which was at issue in AlvarezMachain, is known as the “treaty exception.” Under this exception, the treaty must affirmatively
state that citizens of one country will not be forcibly abducted by the other signator country. See
Brandy Sheely, United States v. Best: International Violation Schmiolation—The Ker-Frisbie
Doctrine Trumps All, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 435-37 (2003).
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home in Uruguay by agents working for the United States government.136 He
was driven to Brazil where he was brutally tortured for seventeen days until he
was drugged and boarded onto a plane.137 Upon arrival in the United States, he
was convicted by the district court of conspiracy to import and distribute
narcotics.138 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme
Court’s expanding interpretation of due process to hold that a court should
divest itself of jurisdiction “where it has been acquired as the result of the
government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the
accused’s constitutional rights.”139
Although Toscanino is still good law, it has consistently been
distinguished and restricted since it was decided to the extent that not one case
expressly affirms it. In 1975, the Second Circuit clarified the Toscanino
holding in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler.140 The court held that in
order for a court to divest itself of jurisdiction, the U.S. agent’s actions must
constitute “conduct of the most outrageous and reprehensible kind.”141 In
Lujan, the defendant was lured from Argentina into Bolivia and taken into
custody by Bolivian officials who were paid agents of the United States.142
The court found that because the conduct did not reach the level of
egregiousness described in Toscanino, the unconventional means used to
acquire Lujan did not “convert [his] abduction which is simply illegal into one
which sinks to a violation of due process.”143 Unfortunately, the various
circuits throughout the United States have repeatedly limited the Toscanino
decision to the point that the “United States position . . . remains linked to the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine.”144
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s decision in Alvarez-Machain reaffirmed
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine by resting its holding on the doctrine and stating that
the Court has never departed from the rule.145 In a companion case of AlvarezMachain, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[i]n the shadow cast by AlvarezMachain, attempts to expand due process rights into the realm of foreign
abductions, as the Second Circuit did in United States v. Toscanino, have been

136. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 269.
137. Id. at 269-70. Toscanino’s captors tortured him by denying sleep, food, and water for
days at a time. Nourishment was provided intravenously only to the extent needed to keep him
alive. In addition, he was kicked, beaten, and shocked with electrodes connected to his earlobes,
toes, and genitals. Id. at 270.
138. Id. at 270.
139. Id. at 275.
140. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
141. Id. at 65.
142. Id. at 63.
143. Id. at 66.
144. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 266-67.
145. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 (1992).
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cut short.”146 Therefore, the mala captus bene detentus principle of the KerFrisbie doctrine still applies today, and United States courts can validly
exercise in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who has been forcibly
abducted from another country. By foreclosing this defensive remedy, the
judiciary perpetuates transborder abductions.
2.

Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule is the other option available to a criminal defendant
as a defensive remedy. The exclusionary rule, as formulated by the Supreme
Court, holds that evidence seized through unconstitutional police conduct is
inadmissible in court.147 The Supreme Court has stated different policy
objectives for excluding evidence, including judicial integrity, deterrence of
police misconduct, and compensation to victims.148 The underlying rationale
for exclusion, however, is that it is the only remedy that can adequately protect
the victim’s fundamental constitutional rights.149
Nevertheless, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure of
146. United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)
(holding that a government-sponsored transborder abduction does not divest the court of
jurisdiction). The Ninth Circuit was troubled by the outcome that they were compelled to reach
but nevertheless had to rely on the precedent of Alvarez-Machain throughout the decision:
While it may seem unconscionable to some that officials serving the interests of justice
themselves become agents of criminal intimidation, like the DEA agents in AlvarezMachain, their purported actions have violated no recognized constitutional or statutory
rights. They have likewise engaged in no illegal conduct which this court could attempt
to deter in the future . . . .
Id. at 763-64. “Matta-Ballestero’s abduction, even if we labeled it a ‘kidnapping,’ does not
violate recognized constitutional or statutory provisions in light of Alvarez-Machain.” Id. at 764
n.5.
147. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 490 (1966) (applying exclusionary rule to the privilege against self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (applying exclusionary
rule to the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 32324 (1959) (applying exclusionary rule to the due process clause).
148. See infra notes 174-205 and accompanying text. Critics of the exclusionary rule
proclaim it as “an all-or-nothing remedy,” that it only offers a benefit to the guilty, and that it
results in a huge loss in convictions. Barry F. Shanks, Comparative Analysis of the Exclusionary
Rule and its Alternatives, 57 TUL. L. REV. 648, 657-58 (1983). However, as the Mapp Court
reasoned when applying the exclusionary rule:
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that
which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary
in the true administration of justice.
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
149. See Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.
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property owned by an alien and located in a foreign country.150 The Court
reasoned that the textual structure of the Amendment “suggests that ‘the
people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . refers to a class of persons
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed
sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”151 Because Verdugo-Urquidez was a citizen of Mexico and the
search took place in Mexico, the Fourth Amendment did not apply.152
Thus, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a transborder abduction
case like Alvarez-Machain because it does not protect aliens or evidence
abroad. Even if Verdugo-Urquidez did not exist, the Supreme Court has held
that suppression of a defendant’s person is not an appropriate remedy for a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.153 As the issue in forcible transborder
abductions is a jurisdictional matter and the only thing to suppress is the
defendant’s person, the exclusionary rule does not help a victim such as
Alvarez-Machain.
B.

Offensive Remedies

The offensive remedies available are for monetary compensation under the
Alien Tort Claims Act154 and the Federal Tort Claims Act.155 Although both
statutes are available, there is no significant difference between the two from
the standpoint of individuals such as Alvarez-Machain because both provide an
after-the-fact monetary remedy.
1.

Alien Tort Claims Act

The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) is a federal jurisdictional statute that
provides a private cause of action where a plaintiff can establish a municipal
tort and a violation of the law of nations or a treaty.156 Specifically, the statute
currently provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of

150. 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990).
151. Id. at 265.
152. Id. at 274-75.
153. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (holding that the body of the
defendant is not a suppressible fruit of an unlawful arrest); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463,
474 (1980) (finding that the defendant is not a suppressible fruit).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
155. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2000).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). The constitutional foundation for jurisdiction under the ATCA
is that the cases “arise under” federal law. For a more detailed discussion of the ATCA, see
generally Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claims: Inquiries
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1 (1985); Kenneth C. Randall, Further
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 473
(1986) [hereinafter Further Inquiries].
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nations or a treaty of the United States.”157 The statute was originally a
provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and prior to 1980, courts had only
sustained jurisdiction under the statute twice.158
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was the first case to successfully invoke the statute
in the human rights context.159 In that case, the Filartigas, who were
Paraguayan citizens residing in the United States, brought an action against
Pena-Irala, also a citizen of Paraguay, for causing the wrongful death of their
son and brother, Joelito.160 The Filartigas claimed that Joelito was kidnapped,
tortured, and killed in retaliation for his father’s political activism.161 The
Filartiga court found that torture violated the law of nations due to the
universal condemnation of torture in international agreements and the
renunciation of torture as an official policy by almost all nations of the
world.162 The court explained that it was not granting new rights to aliens but
was “opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already
recognized by international law.”163
An important part of the Filartiga decision was based on how customary
international law fits into U.S. domestic law. Quoting The Paquete Habana,
the court recognized that “‘[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Both state and non-state actors (including corporate actors,
state officials, and individuals) can be sued for certain offenses under the ATCA. Further
Inquiries, supra note 156, at 495-512. However, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the
Federal Tort Claims Act make it more difficult to bring a claim against foreign states or the
United States. Id. at 507-11.
158. Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v.
Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).
159. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Opponents to the expansive view of the ATCA have
criticized the Filartiga line of decisions for their “flawed reasoning and ‘inappropriate leniency in
allowing U.S. courts jurisdiction over international human rights cases.’” Kathleen M. Kedian,
Note, Customary International Law and International Human Rights Litigation in United States
Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of The Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395, 1411-12
(1999). However:
[R]etreating to an isolationist view that shelters courts from making decisions based on
customary international law is an unsettling solution . . . . On the other hand, . . .
reiterating the authority of federal courts to rule on claims based on customary
international law would enable courts to carry out their responsibility for protecting the
powerless, salvage the United States’s reputation for fostering individual liberty,
demonstrate an eagerness to participate in global accountability, and move the country
confidently into the future.
Id. at 1425. For a more detailed discussion of the ATCA in the human rights realm, see Beth
Stephens, Human Rights Accountability: Congress, Federalism and International Law, 6 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L 277 (2000).
160. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 880.
163. Id. at 887.
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jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination.’”164 As the Filartiga court noted, “it is clear that
courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”165 In holding that
torture was a violation of the law of nations, the court compared the torturer to
the pirate and slave trader and noted that all were “an enemy of all
mankind.”166
Since Filartiga was decided, district courts have been increasingly willing
to accept jurisdiction under the ATCA. In addition, the district courts have
recognized summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment as violations of the law of nations.167 On the
other hand, the Alvarez-Machain court found that there was not an
international norm against transborder abductions, but that every abduction
violates the prohibition against arbitrary arrest.168 Therefore, a victim who has
been forcibly abducted from another country can bring a claim under the
ATCA for any of the aforementioned reasons; however, in order to get relief
for the abduction, the victim must claim that the arrest and detention were
arbitrary, rather than claiming that the abduction itself violates the law of
nations.
2.

Federal Tort Claims Act

The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides a limited waiver against
the sovereign immunity of the United States when one of its employees
commits certain torts.169 The statute grants exclusive jurisdiction to the district
courts on claims against the United States for money damages relating to tort

164. Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). Furthermore, the
Supreme Court observed in The Paquete Habana that ascertaining customary international law
involves “resort . . . to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to
the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.” The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
165. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
166. Id. at 890.
167. E.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 186 (D. Mass. 1995) (finding that summary
execution, disappearance, torture, arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
violated international law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(finding prolonged arbitrary detention and summary execution violated the law of nations).
168. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 617 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). The
Ninth Circuit essentially fit transborder abductions under the label of arbitrary arrest and
detention so that any transborder abduction will violate the law of nations in that it constitutes an
arbitrary arrest and detention.
169. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2674 (2000). The FTCA does not “create any new governmental
liability” and only applies to “existing causes of action.” Thomas A. Kantas, Maximizing Your
Client’s Recovery Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 91 ILL. B.J. 76, 76 (2003).
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claims.170 However, there are several exceptions to the FTCA in which
sovereign immunity is not waived.171 The foreign activities exception
prohibits recovery in claims “arising in a foreign country,” and the intentional
torts exception excludes certain intentional torts except when committed by
“investigative or law enforcement officers.”172 Thus, a victim of a forcible
transborder abduction will have a cause of action under the FTCA against the
United States if the claim does not arise in a foreign country and the intentional
tort is committed by an investigative or law enforcement officer.
V. DEFENSIVE AND/OR OFFENSIVE REMEDY IN LIGHT OF POLICY RATIONALES
There are two remedial mechanisms available to an individual like
Alvarez-Machain: 1) a dismissal of the indictment with or without monetary
compensation; or 2) a criminal trial followed by a civil suit for compensatory
damages.173 Although the exclusionary rule does not apply to forcible
transborder abduction cases, the policy objectives mentioned by the Supreme
Court in various opinions apply differently to defensive and offensive
remedies. The foundation of these holdings is found in Weeks v. United
States.174 “[I]t is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never been forfeited
by his conviction of some public offense,—it is the invasion of this sacred
right” that requires the courts to remedy the government’s misconduct.175
This Part will analyze Supreme Court cases in light of policy goals and
will apply those goals to both a defensive (dismissal of the indictment) and
offensive (monetary compensation) remedy in Alvarez-Machain. Specifically,
the policy goals of judicial integrity, deterrence of government misconduct,
and victim compensation strongly favor dismissal of the indictment. The two
main objections to dismissal are that it undermines law enforcement and
exceeds judicial power. This Part will rebut these arguments by showing that
effective law enforcement is not undermined by dismissal because extradition
exists as an effective mechanism and that dismissal as a remedy does not
exceed judicial power because it is within the judicial branch’s powers to
provide such a remedy.

170. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2000).
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), (k) (2000).
173. See infra notes 174-264 and accompanying text. The United States could offer both a
defensive and offensive remedy for transborder abductions, as various international bodies have
suggested. Nevertheless, a defensive remedy alone is sufficient in most cases. On the other hand,
an offensive remedy should not be the exclusive remedy for reasons that will be shown.
174. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
175. Id. at 391.
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Upholds Judicial Integrity

In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States,176 Justice Brandeis
argued passionately for judicial integrity as a reason that evidence should be
excluded. In Olmstead, the government wiretapped telephone lines in the
defendant’s home and office.177 The information gathered through the taped
conversations was admitted into evidence and ultimately led to a conviction
against the defendant.178 Although the majority of the Supreme Court held that
the wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the decision was later
overruled by Berger v. New York.179 Justice Brandeis wrote a compelling, oftcited dissenting opinion in Olmstead, arguing that the evidence should be
inadmissible for a violation of the Fourth Amendment.180
Justice Brandeis reasoned that if the Court allowed the government to
punish the defendant through illegal means, the Court itself would be ratifying
the illegal actions and the government would become a lawbreaker.181 He
declared that it was the duty of the courts not only to protect individuals from
unreasonable government intrusions, but also to protect the government from
itself:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its
face.182

176. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
177. Id. at 456-57.
178. Id. at 457.
179. 388 U.S. 41, 62-64 (1967).
180. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The passage was cited by the
dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Machain. Justice Stevens observed that even though AlvarezMachain participated in a “brutal murder” of an American law enforcement agent, “[s]uch an
explanation . . . provides no justification for disregarding the Rule of Law that this Court has a
duty to uphold.” United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 686 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
181. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Weeks court used a similar line
of reasoning in finding that government misconduct (unlawful searches) “should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution,
and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such
fundamental rights.” Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
182. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, Justice Brandeis acknowledged that it is the responsibility of the
courts to uphold the integrity of the judicial process by preventing the
government from using illegal means to convict a criminal.
Furthermore, even though a transborder abduction is an international law
violation, the judicial integrity of the courts is implicated as much by these
violations as when a constitutional law violation occurs. This is so because a
violation has occurred, regardless of whether it is an international or
constitutional law violation, and a remedy should be provided.183 As Chief
Justice Marshall so wisely stated:
It is a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must
have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.
....
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this
high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right.184

Even though international law is implicated by transborder abductions, the
principle remains the same—where there is a right, there is a remedy.185 Thus,
it is the duty of the courts to provide this remedy so that the right is
protected.186
Dismissal of the indictment for transborder abductions would most
certainly uphold judicial integrity. The judicial integrity of the Supreme Court
and the courts of the United States was seriously questioned after the AlvarezMachain decision came down in 1992. Legal scholars, international
organizations, and other countries condemned the decision.187 The Supreme
Court’s decision, in effect, sanctioned the violation of Mexico’s territorial
integrity and Alvarez-Machain’s personal rights.
The dissent, however, recognized that the Court’s integrity was at stake
and quoted Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States.188 If the courts
sanction lawless conduct, they become accomplices in the “‘willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold.’”189 As Justice
183. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147, 163 (1803).
184. Id.
185. This idea, also stated as the legal maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, “forms the bedrock of our
system of justice.” United States v. Pena-Gonzalez, 62 F. Supp. 2d 358, 365 (D.P.R. 1999).
186. In fact, the courts are “duty-bound to construct an effective remedy tailored to the
injury. . . . [A] grave violation merits an equally weighty remedy.” Id.
187. See Aceves, supra note 10; see also supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text.
188. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 687 n.33 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
189. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (quoting McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)).
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Stevens correctly noted, by sanctioning the government’s conduct in AlvarezMachain, the Court imperiled the perception of its judicial integrity throughout
its own country and the world.190 Accordingly, dismissal of the indictment and
a denial of in personam jurisdiction uphold judicial integrity.
On the other hand, an offensive remedy does very little to uphold judicial
integrity because the courts would still have in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant.
An offensive remedy, without more, effectively condones
government misconduct because it allows the government to keep the fruits of
its illegality. It might compensate the victim monetarily, but this fact alone
does not uphold the judicial integrity of the courts. The courts would become a
party to the wrongdoing by upholding a constitutional violation and allowing
the government to simply pay off the victim. Therefore, dismissal of the
indictment with or without monetary compensation is the best remedy to
maintain the highest level of judicial integrity.
B.

Deters Government Misconduct

Another important policy goal is deterrence of government and police
misconduct. As Justice Stewart asserted in Elkins v. United States, “[t]he rule
is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—
by removing the incentive to disregard it.”191 In Elkins, the state unlawfully
seized evidence from the defendant’s home.192 After a state prosecution failed
due to the illegality of the search, the state turned the evidence over to federal
officials and a federal indictment followed.193 The Supreme Court held that
evidence obtained by state officers during a search, which if conducted by
federal officers would violate the defendant’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment, is inadmissible.194
The Court reasoned that only the most flagrant police abuses come to the
attention of the courts and that in order to protect the innocent against such
invasions, evidence must be excluded against those who are guilty.195 Indeed,
as Judge Cardozo stated in People v. Defore, “[t]he criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered.”196 Thus, a legitimate policy goal of the

190. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
192. Id. at 206-07
193. Id. at 207 n.1.
194. Id. at 223.
195. Id. at 217-18.
196. 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). The Elkins majority opinion also quoted Professor
Wigmore’s adage:
‘Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly
violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for
contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly,
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Supreme Court is to deter police misconduct, and if a case is dismissed
because of the exclusion of evidence, it is the government’s misconduct that
sets the criminal free, not the courts.
Dismissal of the indictment would deter government misconduct because if
the agents knew that the court would lack jurisdiction once the defendant was
brought into the country, they would use the formal extradition process rather
than simply abducting the suspect. Justice Stevens also warned of the possible
repercussions of the majority’s opinion in Alvarez-Machain. “If the United
States, for example, thought it more expedient to torture or simply to execute a
person rather than to attempt extradition, these options would be equally
available because they, too, were not explicitly prohibited . . . .”197 As it stands
now after Alvarez-Machain and subsequent cases, the DEA and other agencies
have no disincentives to forcibly abduct a wanted criminal.198 Nevertheless, if
the Court would have followed Justice Stevens’s line of argument,
governmental misconduct and forcible abductions would have to stop because
United States courts would not have jurisdiction over the defendant once in the
United States. Thus, a defensive remedy for transborder abductions would
deter government misconduct.
On the other hand, an offensive remedy, without more, would do very little
to deter government misconduct. An offensive remedy by itself would allow
the government to pay the victim after-the-fact for its illegal action. Thus, if
the government valued the defendant’s apprehension more than it valued
international law, it could elect to act in violation of international law and pay
damages. Where gain exceeds harm to the suspect, the government could
violate international law, abduct the suspect and simply pay damages at a later
date. As such, dismissal of the indictment for transborder abductions would be
better at deterring government misconduct than an offensive remedy standing
alone.

but shall do so by reversing Titus’ conviction. This is our way of teaching people like
Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of
securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to
strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else.’
Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.
197. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 674 (1992).
198. E.g., United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming
conviction of Honduran citizen who was tried in federal court after being abducted by U.S.
government agents from his home in Honduras); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 296 F.3d 1277
(11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1038 (2002) (finding that dismissal of the indictment was
not appropriate after DEA agents lured Duarte-Acero, a Colombian national, into Ecuador where
Ecuadorian police arrested him and turned him over to the DEA).
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C. Provides Compensation to Victims
In Bivens, agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics arrested the defendant
in his apartment in front of his wife and children and threatened to arrest the
entire family.199 In addition, the agents searched the entire apartment and
subjected the defendant to a visual strip search.200 He sought damages because
the arrest and search were effected without a warrant and unreasonable force
was used during the arrest.201 The Supreme Court held that Bivens could
recover damages for violations of the Fourth Amendment upon proof of
injuries sustained from federal agents’ actions.202
The Court reasoned that the only protection available to an individual in
that situation is afforded by the judiciary because the sole alternative is
resistance to the officer’s asserted authority, and this might amount to a
crime.203 The Court noted that damages were the historical remedy for
violations of personal liberty and security and that it was the judiciary’s
responsibility to vindicate such rights.204 Furthermore, “‘[t]he very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.’”205 In a concurring
opinion, Justice Harlan explained that compensatory relief is appropriate even
where it will have little deterrent effect because it might be the only remedy to
an innocent victim, to whom the exclusionary rule would not apply.206 Thus,
the Bivens Court held that an individual could recover money damages for
violations of constitutional rights.
A defensive remedy for transborder abductions would not compensate the
victim monetarily. However, it would compensate the victim in the sense that
he gains his freedom and liberty through dismissal of the indictment. It is
probable that any victim who was abducted would prefer the restoration of life
and liberty, rather than monetary compensation. A defensive remedy helps
restore the victim’s intangible rights, which are impossible to value
monetarily.207

199. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 389-90.
202. Id. at 397.
203. Id. at 394-95.
204. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 395, 407.
205. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
206. Id. at 408-10 (Harlan, J., concurring).
207. Although a defensive remedy can help restore intangible rights, it would be impossible
to completely restore them as these lost rights include pain, suffering, humiliation and
embarrassment, which can never be recovered. Thomas M. Antkowiak, Note, Truth as Right and
Remedy in International Human Rights Experience, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 977, 1008 (2002).
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An offensive remedy obviously compensates the victim through damages.
A victim can get damages in return for the violation of his rights. However, it
is almost impossible to think that monetary compensation alone can
completely compensate the victim for the violation of his personal rights, the
pain and suffering, and the humiliation that the forcible abduction caused.
Damages also present a separate problem with valuation. How can a court put
a value on a victim’s personal liberty and human rights? Even if an offensive
remedy compensates a victim more than a defensive remedy in a monetary
sense, it cannot restore a victim’s intangible rights like dismissal of the
indictment. Thus, dismissal of the indictment with or without monetary
compensation adequately compensates the victim, whereas an offensive
remedy, without more, does not.
D. Undermines Law Enforcement
The government argues that dismissal of the indictment undermines
effective law enforcement because it allows the criminal to go free. However,
“the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”208 In addition,
extradition treaties exist as an effective and legal mechanism for capturing
criminals in another country.209 The Attorney General’s Annual Report states
that:
Working jointly with foreign counterparts is a realistic way to achieve the
goals of dismantling international criminal organizations, locating fugitives,
and establishing mutually recognized processes for ensuring criminals are
brought to justice primarily through the extradition process . . . . [Extradition]
treaties provide the means to bring fugitives to justice and supply evidence
necessary to support criminal investigations and prosecutions.210

Because a legal means exists via extradition treaties, there is no reason to
resort to extra-legal means such as abduction; as such, dismissal of the
indictment does not undermine effective law enforcement.
208. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
209. More specifically:
Extradition is a mechanism that allows the prosecution of a crime—even when the suspect
escapes to another country—without jeopardizing the human rights of the citizens of that
neighboring country. The extradition procedure protects the individual rights of the
extraditable person because it always requires a hearing before a judge of the requested
nation.
Ruiz-Bravo, supra note 37, at 840. In addition to protecting the individual’s rights, extradition
preserves the sovereignty and territoriality of the countries involved by “providing a legal channel
for two nation-states to confer with one another in order to properly exercise jurisdiction over an
individual charged with a crime.” Aimee Lee, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The
Deleterious Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 126, 130 (1993).
210. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2002 PERFORMANCE REPORT & FISCAL YEAR
2003 REVISED FINAL PERFORMANCE PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2004 PERFORMANCE PLAN 33-34
(2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2002/pdf/FullReport.pdf.
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The Supreme Court has considered the fact that in many cases law
enforcement would be undermined by the exclusionary rule and has become
more reluctant to apply the exclusionary rule in certain instances due to this
rationale.211 However, the cases in which the Supreme Court has held that the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable have involved minor invasions that were
limited in scope and extent, like the Terry stop.212 In these cases, the Court
balances the intrusiveness of the police actions against the necessity of
obtaining the evidence.213 If this balancing test were applied to a transborder
abduction case, the intrusiveness of the abduction would far outweigh the
necessity of obtaining the suspect since a legal and less intrusive means exists
through an extradition treaty.214
Moreover, the Supreme Court considered whether the exclusionary rule
had rendered the administration of criminal justice ineffective in Mapp v. Ohio
when it decided to extend the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to
the states.215 The Court found that the federal criminal justice system had not
been rendered ineffective since it began operating under the exclusionary rule
in Weeks almost fifty years earlier.216 Furthermore, “‘the history of the
criminal law proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement
impairs its enduring effectiveness.’”217 Thus, the Court recognized that
effective law enforcement does not rest solely on obtaining convictions, but
also on respecting the constitutional boundaries within which the government

211. E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (applying the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to warrantless search of motor home); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21 (1968) (holding that a law enforcement officer can stop and frisk a suspect on reasonable
suspicion).
212. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has consistently held that “[i]n the home . . . all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). By analogy, because the home is such a sacred
place, it would seem that the Court would be repulsed by the kidnapping of an individual, whose
personal rights were completely ignored.
213. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37
(1967)).
214. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (finding that less intrusive means existed in
which the police officers could have carried out the search).
215. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
216. Id. at 659-60. The Elkins court made a similar finding only one year earlier concerning
application of the exclusionary rule in the federal criminal justice system: “the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has [not] thereby been rendered ineffective, [and] the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts has [not] thereby been disrupted.” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 218 (1960).
217. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 658 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)).
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and its agents must operate.218 Because extradition treaties are an effective and
legal means of apprehending criminals abroad, there is no reason that the
government or its agents should operate outside the boundaries of these
treaties.
Nevertheless, the government has been hesitant to rely on extradition
treaties under a mistaken belief that extradition treaties are ineffective. This
causes states to resort to irregular forms of rendition to apprehend a criminal
living abroad.219 Professor Bassiouni has elaborated some of the policy
considerations that go into a determination of whether to use an extradition
treaty:
[1.] The extraditable offenses listed in the treaty may not cover the
specific offense.
[2.] Political and practical considerations in given cases may require a
political compromise among states concerning persons beyond the respective
reach of each state or in the respective custody of each of the given states.
[3.] Commencement of formal proceedings is likely to give notice to the
fugitive and time to flee the jurisdiction of the state of refuge.
[4.] The length of the formal process further delayed by appeals and
collateral attack dilutes its certainty and swiftness.
[5.] The cost of extradition for both states is often significant.
[6.] The weaknesses of the requesting state’s case at the time extradition
is sought may be a bar to it.
[7.] The requesting state may find it necessary to withhold some of the
evidence against the fugitive for trial strategy or other reasons.
[8.] Exceptions and exemptions such as the political offense exception
may contribute to the dilution of the effectiveness of the process.220

Therefore, a country may sometimes resort to an illegitimate process because it
thinks that abduction is the only efficient way to apprehend the suspect.221
218. Respecting constitutional boundaries also means respecting treaty obligations because
Article VI states that “all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST.
art. VI.
219. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 249-311.
220. Id. at 308-09 (renumbered from original).
221. It has been argued that irregular rendition should only be used in extreme cases where
the crime is especially heinous and serious and when the asylum state has refused to punish or
extradite. Jimmy Gurule, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of
International Criminals Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 490-92 (1994). In
addition, the abduction should be directly approved by the Attorney General to ensure that
“proper consideration would be given to foreign policy concerns and would provide for a
comprehensive risk-benefit assessment at the highest levels of government.” Id. at 492.
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However, the process of irregular rendition, especially in the case of a
forcible abduction without state consent, is not necessarily more effective than
the formal extradition process because the consequences of the abduction
outweigh the efficiency of the apprehension. By kidnapping an alien from
another country, the state disrupts world order, violates the infringed-upon
state’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and legal processes and damages the
integrity of the international process.222 In addition, the kidnapping violates
the abducted person’s right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, as
well as international due process and fairness.223 As Professor Bassiouni
states, “[t]he practical considerations of justifying invalid means by a
purportedly valid end must be rejected.”224 And, because an effective means
for detaining suspects exists through extradition treaties, there is no reason to
turn to the invalid means of kidnapping.
Abduction also is not an effective means of capturing a criminal because
the abducting government’s reputation is damaged in the international
community, and future efforts at international cooperation are hindered. In
fact, this has proven true in United States-Mexico relations after the Supreme
Court decided Alvarez-Machain in 1992. Despite the two thousand mile
common border that the states share, no major Mexican drug trafficker was
ever extradited to stand trial in the United States before 2001, and the decision
in Alvarez-Machain only strengthened the Mexican government’s resentment
and mistrust of the United States government.225 Because this is true and
because Mexico requested the repatriation of Alvarez-Machain immediately
after his abduction, dismissal of the indictment would not undermine law

Nonetheless, in Alvarez-Machain the United States never requested Mexico to extradite the
suspect, and Mexico did not refuse to punish him; the Attorney General did not authorize or
approve the abduction; and although the crime was serious and heinous, there wasn’t even
sufficient evidence to convict Alvarez-Machain in court. Still yet, the best policy is to prohibit all
transborder abductions in all circumstances, which would force more reliance on extradition
treaties. Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 746, 755 (1992).
222. BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 309-10.
223. Id. at 310.
224. Id. at 311. If an extradition request fails for whatever reason, the solution should not be
to forcibly abduct an individual. As Professor Bassiouni explains:
The solution, however, should be to make extradition more efficient, not to subvert it by
resorting to unlawful or legally questionable means. . . . At this stage in the development
of international law, it is no longer possible to rationalize violations of international law
on grounds of expediency or to allow such violations to be perpetrated without an
adequate deterrent-remedy.
Id. at 251.
225. Rishi Hingoraney, Note, International Extradition of Mexican Narcotics Traffickers:
Prospects and Pitfalls for the New Millennium, 30 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 331, 331, 351 (2002).
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enforcement, as it would strengthen the abducting government’s reputation
within the international community.226
In addition, a defensive remedy would further international cooperation in
the apprehension of foreign criminals because nation states would have to
work together through pre-existing extradition treaties.
The Attorney
General’s Report recognizes that extradition treaties “forge strong law
enforcement relationships between the U.S. and other countries, and they
convey an obligation to assist in international extradition.”227 The Report
further states that international cooperation is “critical to addressing the
dramatic growth in the scope of transnational crime,” thus recognizing the
substantial benefits that extradition has over unilateral actions like
abduction.228
Extradition treaties have been effective and useful in the past and continue
to be so today. In fact, only two extradition requests were turned down by the
State Department of the United States in a period of twenty-one years.229 As
John Kester noted, “[t]here is no reason to believe that the percentage is any
different today.”230 These high statistics of cooperation through extradition
treaties are likely the same throughout the world, especially when a country is
dealing with a request from the United States because extradition candidates
“can become unattractive pawns in global geopolitics.”231 Thus, extradition is
226. Analisa W. Scrimger, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Forcible Abduction
as an Acceptable Alternative Means of Gaining Jurisdiction, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 369,
388-90 (1993).
227. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 210, at 34.
228. Id. at 33. The number of extradition requests also demonstrates how important
international cooperation is within the international community when it comes to capturing
criminals. In Fiscal Year 1992, there were only 842 extradition requests, whereas there were
3,923 requests in Fiscal Year 2000. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2000 PERFORMANCE
REPORT AND FISCAL YEAR 2002 PERFORMANCE PLAN 17 (2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/
annualreports/pr2000/TableofContents.htm. Furthermore, the U.S. State Department sends out
many more extradition requests every year than it receives. In Fiscal Year 2002, 269 fugitives
were surrendered to the United States, while 102 fugitives were surrendered from the U.S. U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 210, at 34.
229. Kester, supra note 5, at 1486.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1487. Kester further argues:
If a foreign country wants a United States resident badly, and that country can or does
provide something else—say, a military base or a trade agreement—that the United States
would like to have, one individual (who it is easy to assume is probably guilty, anyway)
may be a cheap price to pay, in the minds of United States diplomats, to help secure a
more important end.
Id. This applies with equal force when the United States is the requesting country because the
U.S. can use humanitarian aid or military assistance as a bargaining tool. For an example of how
the United States has recently used aid as a coercive bargaining tool in international relations,
look no further than the bilateral immunity agreements that many countries reluctantly signed
with the United States concerning the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
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an effective mechanism for capturing a suspect; consequently, dismissal of the
indictment would not undermine law enforcement.
While an offensive remedy does not undermine effective law enforcement,
it certainly does not strengthen law enforcement mechanisms. Although a
court would maintain jurisdiction over a criminal and the government could
succeed in prosecution, an offensive remedy, without more, effectively excuses
lawless action. By doing this, it makes the United States appear to be above
the law, as the courts have jurisdiction over a defendant regardless of whether
the government forcibly abducted him or chose to rely on the formal
extradition process. This, in turn, hampers cooperation between nations in
apprehending suspects and ultimately leads to less effective law enforcement
because other nations would not be willing to work with the United States in
international criminal law issues.
Furthermore, an offensive remedy, without more, fails to secure
compliance with constitutional and international law because it encourages
illegal abductions by allowing a court to retain jurisdiction regardless of how
the suspect was apprehended. As the Elkins court stated, “‘[e]xperience has
demonstrated . . . that neither administrative, criminal nor civil remedies are
effective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures.’”232 Thus, dismissal of
the indictment is the only remedy that will stop transborder abductions and it
will not undermine law enforcement efforts because extradition is an efficient
mechanism to apprehend foreign criminals.
E.

Limits on Judicial Power

Judicial restraint is another concern of the courts because the judiciary
does not sit to question political decisions.233 Courts are skeptical of becoming
involved in cases dealing with international relations and international law
because they do not want to overstep their boundaries and question policy
choices constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch or Congress.234 As
such, when a potential treaty violation has occurred, the Judicial Branch is
cautious in its decision and often defers to the views of the Executive

Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court: A Paradox of
“Operation Enduring Freedom,” 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 19 (2003); Benjamin B.
Ferencz, Misguided Fears About the International Criminal Court, 15 PACE INT’L L. REV. 223,
230-46 (2003); Bungling Bully: Strong-Arm Diplomacy is Damaging US Interests Abroad, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 3, 2003, at 18.
232. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960) (quoting People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d
905, 911-13 (Cal. 1955)).
233. The political question doctrine prohibits courts from examining government actions that
are “mere political act[s].” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 164 (1803).
234. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2004]

FORCIBLE TRANSBORDER ABDUCTION

1413

Branch.235 Nevertheless, courts have the “authority to construe treaties,”
which is a “recurring and accepted task for the federal courts.”236 The question
of whether or not the courts should intervene and provide a remedy has been a
recurring issue in many cases dealing with a foreigner’s rights under the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.237
In Breard v. Greene, the defendant, a citizen of Paraguay, was convicted of
murder and attempted rape and sentenced to death.238 In 1996, Breard filed a
motion for habeas relief claiming that his convictions and sentence should be
overturned because he had never been notified of his right to contact the
Paraguayan Consulate, a violation of the Vienna Convention.239 The Republic
of Paraguay instituted proceedings in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
against the United States for violations of the Vienna Convention at the time of
Breard’s arrest.240 The ICJ issued an order requesting the United States to
“‘take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings.’”241 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court denied relief and held that Breard procedurally defaulted
his claim by failing to raise it in the state court.242
The Court reasoned that under principles of international law, the
procedural rules of the forum state govern the implementation of a treaty and
that under United States procedural law, Breard was required to assert his
Vienna Convention claim in state court.243 The Court, in dictum, stated that
even if a Vienna Convention claim were properly raised in state court
proceedings, it is “extremely doubtful” that the violation would result in
reversing the conviction without a finding that the violation had an effect on
the trial.244

235. E.g., Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Serv., 177 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir.
1999); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194
(1961) (“While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given
great weight.”); but see Tachiona v. Mugabe, 186 F. Supp. 2d 383, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he
theory [of deference to the Executive Branch’s interpretation] makes a mockery of constitutional
separation of powers. Manifestly, its effectuation would spell doom for judicial independence.”).
236. Japan Whaling Ass’n, 478 U.S. at 230.
237. Vienna Convention, supra note 109 and accompanying text.
238. 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 374.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 375.
243. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-76.
244. Id. at 377.
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Regrettably, the Supreme Court never even considered the ICJ’s request to
delay execution until the proceedings were complete.245 The Court found that
it was within the executive branch’s power to stay the execution, and that the
judiciary did not have the power to do so based on existing statutes or case
law.246 Thus, relying on judicial restraint, the Court would not consider the
ICJ’s request because it involved foreign relations and would violate the
separation of powers.247
However, the Supreme Court did not impose similar judicial restraint on
itself in the case of Cook v. United States.248 In Cook, a treaty between the
United States and Great Britain allowed the search of a vessel within a state’s
territorial waters, which was defined as one hour’s traveling distance measured
by the maximum speed of the seized vessel.249 Although the treaty mentioned
compensation, it did not expressly mention a defense to a fine. The United
States Coast Guard boarded a British vessel, which was capable of traveling
ten miles per hour, 11.5 miles from the United States coast and seized
intoxicating liquor.250 Even though the seizure took place outside the agreed
upon distance, the ship’s master was fined $14,286.18 for failure to include
liquor in the ship’s manifest.251
The Supreme Court allowed the ship’s master to assert the treaty as a
defense and held that the treaty violation deprived the court of jurisdiction:
The objection to the seizure is not that it was wrongful merely because made
by one upon whom the government had not conferred authority to seize at the
place where the seizure was made. The objection is that the government itself
lacked power to seize, since by the Treaty it had imposed a territorial limitation
upon its own authority. . . . Our government, lacking power to seize, lacked
power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our laws. To hold that
adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose
and effect of the Treaty.252

Thus, the Supreme Court allowed Cook to defensively invoke the treaty and
dismissed the case.

245. The Supreme Court’s opinion was announced less than one hour before Breard’s
execution was scheduled. The execution was able to be carried out on time, thus giving
absolutely no weight or deference to the ICJ’s opinion or Breard’s rights. Ray, supra note 117, at
1744.
246. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378.
247. For reasons why the Supreme Court should have considered the ICJ’s request, see
Justices Stevens’ and Breyer’s dissenting opinions in the denial of certiorari in Torres v. Mullin,
124 S.Ct. 562 (2003). See also supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
248. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
249. Id. at 110-11.
250. Id. at 107.
251. Id. at 108.
252. Id. at 121-22.
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It has been argued that this interpretation respects the purposes of the
Supremacy Clause: “By making treaties the supreme law of the land and
thereby giving individuals, including foreigners, the right to raise treaty rights
in American courts, the Framers hoped to reduce potential conflict with the
foreigners’ home countries.”253 The Cook holding prevented the development
of this conflict by construing the treaty liberally. Thus, although courts have
used judicial restraint when foreign relations and politics are involved, Cook
represents a case where the judiciary did not restrict itself.
The United States government argues that to allow courts to decide cases
involving customary international law:
threaten[s] the fundamental constitutional principles that reserve to the
political branches the authority to make judgments about how to conduct the
Nation’s foreign affairs and that seek to ensure that the Nation speaks with one
voice on such matters. . . . “Congress—not the Judiciary—is to determine,
through legislation, what international law is and what violations of it ought to
be cognizable in the courts.”254

In short, the government contends that the Judicial Branch should not
supervise the Executive Branch’s “conduct of foreign policy and law
enforcement activities abroad,”255 and that it is not appropriate for the courts to
provide a remedy that has not been authorized by the political branches.256
Even if the President has the power to authorize violations of international
law through his foreign affairs powers, lower-level executive officials do not
have this authority.257 There is nothing in the record of Alvarez-Machain to
show that the decision to abduct was approved by the President, Attorney
General, or any other cabinet officer.258 Furthermore, 21 U.S.C. § 878(a) gives
DEA agents the power to “make arrests without warrant . . . for any felony,
cognizable under the laws of the United States” and to “perform such other law
enforcement duties as the Attorney General may designate.”259 Thus, the
express statutory language does not permit unauthorized extraterritorial arrests;
rather, it refers to the Attorney General’s authority to designate such activities.
253. Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts—
Jurisdictional Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants
Kidnapped Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1445 (1996).
254. Brief for the United States at 10, 15, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 807 (2003)
(No. 03-339) (quoting Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
255. Petition of United States at 15, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (2003)
(No. 03-485).
256. Id.; Brief for the United States at 10, 15, Sosa (No. 03-339).
257. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1986) (observing that the
President can “disregard international law in service of domestic needs” and “‘act in ways that
constitute violations of international law by the United States’”).
258. Brief for Alvarez-Machain at 5, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 821 (2003)
(No. 03-485).
259. 21 U.S.C. § 878(a)(3), (5) (2000).
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Because there is no evidence that the President, Attorney General or other
cabinet-level official authorized the abduction, and because the statute does not
provide low-level DEA officials with the power to authorize such an
abduction, the judiciary does not need to limit its power to adjudicate the case.
Furthermore, the political branches exercise more control over offensive
remedies than defensive remedies. When a right has been established, it is
normally the decision of Congress whether to attach individual liability for
violations.260 For example, when Congress enacted the Torture Victim
Protection Act,261 it chose to increase the use of the federal court system for
violations of international law by extending the right to sue for torture to
citizens and aliens.262 Likewise, Congress could choose to preclude an ATCA
or FTCA remedy for transborder abductions if they chose to do so, but it has
not decided to do so.263 Even so, it is typically a decision of Congress to grant
an offensive remedy and private damages, rather than the judiciary.
If the established right does not contemplate private damages, “it would
not be sound judicial policy to conjure a legal theory that would expose
individual officers to liability for breaches of international treaties.”264 On the
other hand, the Judicial Branch has historically played an active role in
formulating defensive remedies, whereas the political branches have had little
or no part in creating defensive remedies.265 The Supreme Court created the
exclusionary rule and the political branches did not authorize this decision and,
in fact, vehemently opposed it.266 The judiciary historically has not limited

260. United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2000) (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Recognizing that the exclusionary rule is the only adequate and appropriate
remedy for Vienna Convention violations, Judge Thomas reasoned that “[i]n fact, the only [other]
options readily apparent are private damage actions . . . . The decision on whether to attach
individual liability for such violations should be left to Congress.” Id. at 895.
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000) (Torture Victim Protection).
262. Id.
263. As Judge Walker commented, the ATCA:
is simply an act of Congress. If it raises valid policy concerns and if adjudication under it
leads to real-world problems for the executive or the legislature, it may be amended, or
even repealed. The fact that Congress has not done so, and, indeed, appears to have
endorsed the Filartiga approach in the legislative history of the Torture Victim Protection
Act, indicates that the substantial concerns that have been voiced are, at least at this point,
largely theoretical.
Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International Human Rights Violations
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539, 560 (1997).
264. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 895 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
265. See supra notes 123-53 and accompanying text.
266. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650-53 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490
(1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
323-24 (1959). “The most elemental concepts of checks and balances and separation of powers
explain why a branch of government that is found to act illegally should not have the ability to
prevent a remedy for its own wrongful conduct.” Brief for Alvarez-Machain at 46, United States
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itself when considering defensive remedies, where the opposite has been true
regarding offensive remedies. As such, the limits on judicial power support
dismissal of the indictment over monetary damages because this is a remedy
traditionally granted by the Judicial Branch and not by the other political
branches.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that transborder abductions violate a State’s territorial integrity,
the abducted individual’s personal rights and liberty, and international law.
The United States’ choice of an offensive remedy in place of a defensive
remedy for transborder abductions is mistaken, as it was previously shown that
a defensive remedy with or without monetary compensation can better
accomplish policy objectives set out by various Supreme Court decisions.267 A
defensive remedy, and more precisely dismissal of the indictment, upholds
judicial integrity, deters government misconduct, and compensates the victim
by re-establishing his liberty and personal rights. The dismissal of the
indictment would not undermine law enforcement efforts because extradition
treaties are an efficient mechanism to detain a suspect, and it is within the
judiciary’s powers to grant such a remedy. Conversely, an offensive remedy,
when not coupled with a defensive remedy, only compensates the victim
monetarily. Refusal to dismiss the indictment tends to promote lawless
conduct and harms the integrity of the judicial system both within the United
States and throughout the world.
As such, the courts should not adhere to the flawed policy of the KerFrisbie doctrine and should instead repatriate a victim of a transborder
abduction. Repatriation and dismissal of the indictment uphold the integrity
and process of international law and further international cooperation in the
apprehension of criminal suspects. However, as the minority counsel of the
v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992) (No. 91-712). In his dissent in Lombera-Camorlinga,
Judge Thomas explained another reason why a court should not give deference to government
positions when the government is a party to the case: “[government] positions developed in
response to a lawsuit are not of the same character: they are specifically tailored to help obtain a
favorable outcome in a pending controversy in which the agency is involved.” LomberaCamorlinga, 206 F.3d at 895 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
267. As Jorge Reinaldo A. Vanossi stated in the Inter-American Juridical Committee decision
concerning Alvarez-Machain,
[i]n the general order of life and, no less in the life of peoples, situations come up that are
sometimes errors, sometimes misfortunes, and sometimes mysteries. This being the case,
errors must be corrected, misfortunes require our resignation to them, and mysteries must
be explained. The topic that concerns us today is neither a mystery nor a misfortune. It is
simply an error . . . .
Legal Opinion on the Decision of the US Supreme Court in the Alvarez-Machain Case, CP Res.
586, Inter-Am. Juridical Comm. Doc. CJI/RES.II-15/92 (Aug. 15, 1992), reprinted in 13 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 395, 397 (1992) (explanation of concurring vote of Dr. Jorge Reinaldo A. Vanossi).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1418

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1373

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Friedlander, commented, “‘it
seems to be the practice of the United States to do what it wants to do; it has
long been so and probably will continue to be so.’”268 Thus, until the Supreme
Court is willing to overrule the Ker-Frisbie line of cases dealing with
transborder abductions, it seems that the United States can and probably will
continue to apprehend suspects through forcible transborder abductions.
International law has evolved to no longer accept transborder abductions as a
legitimate way to apprehend a suspect and has shown that jurisdiction should
not be upheld in such a case. Hopefully the United States’ courts will soon
follow suit and require the dismissal of the indictment when a suspect has been
forcibly abducted from another country.
ASHLEY WRIGHT BAKER

268. Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the International
Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 813, 884-85 (1993) (quoting
Robert Friedlander, Comments at the 84th Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (1990)).
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